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 Alternative New Collective Security Models 
Options for Countries of Eastern Europe 
 
LESYA DORОSH, YARYNA TURCHYN 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Ukraine is the first country in the world that voluntarily chose the path 
of nuclear disarmament. This step contributed to the global spread of the image 
of Ukraine as a peace-loving state seeking for international stability. According 
to some analysts, the rejection of strategic nuclear weapon gave Ukraine the 
possibility to relatively peacefully survive the turbulent 1990s on the post-
Soviet territory and relatively painlessly withdraw from the USS1. 
For Ukraine, the reduction and destruction of strategic nuclear weapons 
was associated with the expectation of “credible” guarantees for its national 
security from the nuclear weapons states and the global community. Currently, 
the undeclared armed aggression of Russia, Moscow’s support of terrorists and 
sabotage forces in the eastern Ukraine actualize the issue of “quality” of the 
guarantees given to our country as a non-nuclear weapon state, according to the 
Budapest Memorandum. In fact, its paragraphs enunciatively claim that, in case 
of military threats to Ukraine, the guarantor states are only obliged to launch 
consultations in order to resolve the conflict2. It has to be noted that recently the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov said Russia did not violate the 
Budapest Memorandum since it did not threaten Ukraine with nuclear strikes. 
This is the new Russian view on this treaty. Nuclear weapons states’ neglecting 
attitude towards security guarantees for those states which have rejected nuclear 
weapons shapes the image of this weaponry not only as a deterrence, but also as 
a convincing argument in opposition for leadership and resources. Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, which in the mid-nineties also abandoned nuclear arsenal in 
exchange for guarantees from the USA, Russia and the UK, find themselves in a 
similar situation. Nowadays, they are not among NATO member-states, and 
large Russian ethnic groups live on the territories of these countries, creating 
possibilities for expansion of the “Russian World”. 
                                                 
1 
 B. Butkevych, A. Zhalko-Tytarenko, “The Rocket Reincarnation. Is It Necessary to 
Return Nuclear Status for Ukraine”, The Ukrainian week, April 17, 2014, 
http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/107226. 
2 
 “The Memorandum of Security Assurances Due to the Accession of Ukraine to 
Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/ 
laws/show/998_158. 
54 LESYA DORОSH, YARYNA TURCHYN 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 1  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is worth mentioning that, in the framework of nuclear non-proliferation, 
such countries as Switzerland, Sweden, Iraq, Japan, Libya, Poland, Romania and 
Germany were forced to curtail their nuclear programs and projects. Argentina, 
Brazil and South Africa voluntarily gave up on their nuclear program research, 
while Romania had experimental devices for civilian research and developed 
nuclear centres for energy. In addition, this generates international tension since 
the aggressive foreign policy of Russia has raised doubts concerning the 
regulatory function of the international law. In fact, the Russian Federation 
jeopardizes the entire regime of nuclear non-proliferation formed during last 
thirty years. Current Russian behaviour introduces instability into regional and 
global security, and thus, hinders the process of nuclear disarmament. Such 
activity forms the belief that interests of non-nuclear weapons states are 
significantly less protected than of the states-members of the nuclear club. 
Therefore, politicians and scientists continue a lively discussion concerning 
Ukraine joining one of the existing collective security systems, and NATO inter 
alia. Facts proving that the Russian Federation and its supporters in Ukraine do not 
comply with the Minsk agreements on resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine 
stimulate more heated debates on the issue of security and only confirm the 
expediency of Ukraine’s membership in a certain system of collective security. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
Since the independence of Ukraine was proclaimed in the early 
twentieth century, Ukrainian political elite appealed to various options in order 
to support national interests and security. Multi-vector activity, the rejection of 
non-aligned status, joining a framework of collective security, the need to seek 
help from allies, etc. were considered. Obviously, nowadays, the state’s ability 
to independently protect itself by using its own armed forces urgently needs to 
be supported by partners in order to counteract the aggressor. Thus, proposals 
concerning the creation of new security systems appear. Such systems would 
encompass states which are under significant threat of an attack at a new stage 
of establishing the international order. Therefore, the research on the 
alignment/neutrality of Ukraine in the context of new approaches to national 
and international security is topical. 
Since Ukraine’s national security protection is now a top priority, the 
source analysis of the research proves considerable attention of scientists 
(Artemov3, Kapitonenko4, Lazareva5, Mikhaylenko6, Yavorska7) concerning 
                                                 
3
  M. Artemov, “The Continental Climax”, Comments, May 9, 2014, 
http://gazeta.comments.ua/?art=1399457614. 
4
  M. Kapitonenko, “NATO-Ukraine: The Time for New Opportunities”, ZN.UA, April 10, 
2015, http://gazeta.dt.ua/international/ukrayina-nato-chas-novih-mozhlivostey-_.html. 
5 
 А. Lazareva, “Now or Never. United Europe Requires the Common Security and Defense 
Strategy”, The Ukrainian week, March 28, 2013, http://tyzhden.ua/World/75204. 
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advantages and disadvantages of Ukraine’s membership in NATO or other 
collective security systems. The priority of their research lies in determining the 
extent of Ukraine-NATO cooperation deepening, specification of strategic 
directions, and defining political importance of membership in the alliance. In 
addition, analytical developments and projects of authorship gain currency 
suggesting new collective security systems in which Ukraine would play the 
primary role or one of the major ones, and variants of cooperation within the 
Collective Security Treaty at least with individual NATO member-states. The 
achievements of such researchers as Valeeva8, Kramar9, Lucas10, Korbut11, 
focused on hypothetical strategies used by members of such associations, the 
role of global leaders in these strategies, etc., are worth highlighting. At the 
same time, it should be understood that the situation in Ukraine, taking into 
account its national, as well as regional and international, security, raises 
considerable discussions concerning reasons of unfulfilled vectors of Ukraine's 
strategic partnership with the European states and the USA, consequences of 
developing Ukraine’s own overall national security strategy for other actors of 
the European and global space. In this context, updating of normative legal 
documents of strategic nature should not be overlooked. This concerns, 
primarily, the fundamental Ukraine’s foreign policy laws (“On the Principles of 
Internal and External Policies”, “The National Security Strategy of Ukraine”12).  
Summarizing, the lack of conceptual theoretical studies, which could 
add to the journalistic essays and other works of those who care about the future 
Ukraine, has to be noted. They would concern not only advantages and 
disadvantages of Ukraine’s participation in all known systems of collective 
security, but also suggest a range of specific ways for transformation of regional 
security in Central and Eastern Europe involving global leaders, in the 
                                                                                                                       
6
  M. Mikhaylenko, “The Target Coalitions Instead of Alliances”, Comments, September 6, 
2013, http://gazeta.comments.ua/?art=1378369343. 
7
  H. Yavorska, “European Security and NATO”, The Ukrainian week, February 29, 2008, 
http://tyzhden.ua/Columns/50/1197. 
8
  Yu. Valeeva, “The Challenges to European Security Architecture: Ukrainian Context”, 
UA Foreign Affairs, November 12, 2014, http://uaforeignaffairs.com/ua/ekspertna-
dumka/view/article/vikliki-jevropeiskii-arkhitekturi-bezpeki-ukrajinski/. 
9
  O. Kramar, “Take Out the Head from the Sand”, The Ukrainian week, April 18, 2014, 
http://tyzhden.ua/Politics/107233. 
10
  E. Lucas, “The New Security Configuration”, The Ukrainian week, April 16, 2015, 
http://tyzhden.ua/Columns/50/134918; Idem, “The New Defence Alliance”, The 
Ukrainian week, June 25, 2015, http://tyzhden.ua/Columns/50/139407; Idem, “The 
Nuclear Sobs”, The Ukrainian week, October 6, 2014, 
http://tyzhden.ua/Columns/50/120475. 
11
  А. Korbut, “Neighbourhood Disagreement”, The Ukrainian week, June 25, 2015, 
http://tyzhden.ua/World/139400. 
12 
 “On the Principles of Internal and External Policies”, the Law of Ukraine, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17; “The National Security Strategy of 
Ukraine”, approved by the Presidential Decree of 26 May 2015, No. 287/2015, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/287/2015#n14. 
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framework of which Ukraine and its neighbours could find guarantees of 
protection against external aggression. On this basis, a new European security 
architecture has to be established (taking into account the hypothetical 
possibility of Ukraine’s membership into NATO in the long run). The objective 
of this article is to clarify options for Ukraine’s membership in classical 
collective security models, primarily NATO, and the probability of forming 
new collective security models supported by Ukraine. 
 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Membership 
in Collective Security Systems 
 
International security is a multi-dimensional concept which 
encompasses national security of individual countries and peoples, regional 
(sub-regional) security of certain groups of states and parts of the planet, and 
thus, integrates to the level of global international security. The latter is 
considered when protection and realization of human values and interests, 
overcoming threats on the global scale with impact on the security of other 
states, are referred to. In the course of overcoming these threats, certain states 
unite and construct such a configuration of international institutions and legal 
mechanisms, measures and safeguards, which together prevent the use of armed 
force against the respective countries concerning various issues and neutralize 
other factors that might endanger these states’ existence and security. This 
refers to collective security systems within which overall security of states is 
guaranteed on the regional or interregional scales through their joint efforts in 
preventing threats to peace and acts of aggression. 
Researchers have determined the following main features of collective 
security systems: 1) member-states take on at least three commitments which 
define the internal functioning of the system, namely: a) not to resort to force in 
mutual relations; b) to resolve all disagreements peacefully; c) to cooperate for 
the elimination of any threat to peace; 2) there is a structural unity of states, 
embodied in an international organization, coordination and advisory bodies, 
systematic meetings, sessions and other activities of the members within this 
organization and beyond it. The British publicist E. Lucas described a 
simplified security system: “Collective security depends on a mixture of trust 
and fear: trust that your allies will make sacrifices for you, and fear that you will 
suffer if you challenge or break the rules”13. 
One of the most influential interregional organizations and collective 
security systems is NATO. Currently, this organization directly borders Ukraine 
and thus, in the context of the Russian military conflict with Ukraine, reacts to it 
and to the situation in the Euro-Atlantic and global security space in general. 
                                                 
13
  E. Lucas, “Will NATO Respond with a Bang or a Whimper?”, European Voice, September 18, 
2014, http://www.politico.eu/article/will-nato-respond-with-a-bang-or-a-whimper. 
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For instance, after the summit in Wales (September 2014), NATO member-
states made the most important step in the post-Cold War history – the return to 
collective defence as a security priority resulting from adaptation to new 
realities, manifested mainly in the spreading of hybrid conflicts, particularly 
wars. Under such circumstances, member-states have to modernize their 
defence planning, logistics, infrastructure and approaches to a combination of 
hard and soft power as means of hybrid war. However, according to the Head of 
the Security and Defence Policy Programme Marian Majer, the adoption of such 
decisions and the adaptation of the Alliance to new realities is a challenge 
because the organization includes 28 members with their unique political 
systems and internal problems14. 
Considering the dynamics of the discussion on advantages and 
disadvantages of Ukraine’s membership of NATO, two important points should 
be taken into account. Firstly, it is appropriate to record the level of public 
support of Ukraine’s accession to the alliance (Diagrams 1, 2), where the figures 
reflect slow but positive dynamics of Ukrainians’ attitude to the Alliance15.  
 
 
 
Diagram 1. Ukraine’s Attitude in Favour of Joining the Alliance 
 
                                                 
14
  M. Majer, “It Is Important for Ukraine to Keep Patience”, The Ukrainian week, June 25, 
2015, http://tyzhden.ua/World/139403. 
15
  “More than Half of Ukrainian People Supported Joining the EU, and Only 12% – the 
Customs Union”, Ukrainian Pravda, April 23, 2015, www.pravda.com.ua/ 
news/2015/04/23/7065596; O. Kramar, “Take Out the Head from the Sand”, cit.; E. 
Lucas, “The New Defence Alliance”, cit.; “The Results of the Survey ‘Foreign policy 
Orientations of Citizens of Ukraine’”, Razumkov Sentre, April 24, 2015, 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=615. 
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Diagram 2. Ukraine’s Attitude Against Joining the Alliance 
 
It is clear that the level of public support concerning Ukraine’s 
accession to NATO largely depends on the rate and quality of Ukrainian 
information policy. Thus, according to Ukrainian diplomats, it is important to 
convey accurate information about pros and cons of NATO membership, dispel 
myths, change stereotypes among people. For years, the Ukrainian ruling elite 
had been neglecting coverage of characteristic features of the integration for the 
general public under active Russian propaganda, which resulted in opposing 
NATO membership by the majority of Ukrainians16. 
Secondly, an important argument in the debate is the attitude of the 
political elite and the public of NATO member-states to the Ukrainian prospects 
in joining the Alliance. For years, they were passive, sceptical and generally 
negative though the elite of the Alliance members formally recognized the 
stabilizing role of Ukraine in Europe. Thus, on May 20, 2012, during the NATO 
summit in Chicago, the organization adopted a declaration which states, in its 
35th paragraph, that an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine is a key to 
Euro-Atlantic security17. 
The positive result of the recent events in Ukraine and around it was 
that today, the public of the Alliance member-states largely understands the 
desire of the Ukrainian elite to join NATO, because one and a half years ago 
                                                 
16
  “NATO Countries Need Ukraine Not Less than We Need Them”, The Ukrainian week, 
July 17, 2015, http://tyzhden.ua/Society/141240. 
17
  M. Mikhaylenko, “The Target Coalitions Instead of Alliances”, Comments, September 6, 
2013, http://gazeta.comments.ua/?art=1378369343. 
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(along with taking the offices by P. Poroshenko and A. Yatsenyuk) the need for 
membership was not even mentioned. Similarly, the stereotype that Euro-
Atlantic integration is preferred by only a small minority of Ukrainian citizens 
was dominant in the West. In this context, analysts cite the statement of former 
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski that NATO does not 
consider the possible inclusion of Ukraine because it “wants to include only 
those member-states which really want to be in the Alliance and make it more 
secure”18. Other researchers, considering the history of this issue, mention the 
year 2008, when the NATO summit in Bucharest gave Georgia and Ukraine an 
unfulfilled promise of aid and NATO membership. Therefore, today NATO is 
careful in statements on membership prospects for both Ukraine and Georgia19.  
It has to be admitted that today the alliance’s attitude to the partnership 
with Ukraine has changed, as well as the foreign policy priorities and national 
interests of Ukraine. In particular, changes were introduced into the article 11 of 
the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of Internal and External Policies”. They 
re-instituted the provision for integration into the Euro-Atlantic security space, 
removed from the list of national priorities in 2010. Thus, the law de jure 
abolished nonaligned status of Ukraine, which still exists de facto, and defined 
the priority to deepen cooperation with NATO in order to meet the criteria 
required for membership in this organization20. Given the duration of the 
Russian threat and other changes in the external and domestic security 
environments (growing threat of ISIS, terrorism, economic crisis, the occupation 
of the Crimea-Donbass area), Ukraine needs further improvements in the 
normative field of national security, strengthening its updated security priorities.  
The National Security Strategy of Ukraine, approved by the Decree of 
the President of Ukraine in May 201521, is important for accomplishing such a 
task. It defines the main directions of the state policy in the security sphere as 
following: restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally 
recognized state borders; establishing an effective security and defence sector; 
and improvement of state’s capabilities, through deepening the military-
industrial and military-technical cooperation with the NATO and EU member-
states inter alia in order to achieve complete independence from Russia in terms 
of production and maintenance of armoury and military equipment components. 
In addition, the document provides for the reform and development of 
intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement, public administration 
reform and reaching new quality of anti-corruption policy22. 
                                                 
18
  O. Kramar, “Take Out the Head from the Sand”, cit. 
19 
 M. Majer, “It Is Important for Ukraine to Keep Patience”, cit. 
20 
 “On the Principles of Internal and External Policies”, the Law of Ukraine, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17. 
21
  “The National Security Strategy of Ukraine”, cit. 
22
 “Poroshenko has Approved the Ukraine’s National Security Strategy”, The Ukrainian week, 
May 27, 2015, http://tyzhden.ua/News/137269. 
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Ukraine’s strategic goals in this document declare the creation of conditions 
for state’s accession to NATO. The cooperation with NATO will promote democratic 
values in Ukraine; the formation of a stable security environment is an important tool 
to support reforms, particularly in the defence and security sector, development of 
joint responses to modern security challenges and threats23. 
Therefore, Ukraine has currently determined the priorities of its 
security. However, it should be noted that candidates for NATO membership 
have to fulfil many criteria, concerning a certain level of internal stability in 
particular. Thus, a NATO candidate takes the responsibility for “peaceful 
settlement of ethnic conflicts and external territorial disputes, including claims 
for not reunited land, and internal jurisdictional disputes”.  However, some 
researchers point out that the Charter of the organization does not contain points 
restricting membership of a state which has problems with its boundaries24.  
In the Ukrainian case, another crucial task towards joining NATO is the 
transformation of the security sector (Diagram 3). However, given the degradation 
of the latter during recent years, due to lack of funds and corruption, it requires 
reconstruction rather than transformation. It is clear that the length of the process is 
another factor of restrained and cautious attitude of the European and American 
officials to the prospects of Ukraine’s membership of NATO. 
 
 
Diagram 3. Main Problems of Ukraine in Joining NATO 
 
It should be emphasized that NATO is already helping Ukraine in 
addressing this issue. For instance, there are NATO trust funds formed due to 
contributions of member-states (total funding in 2014-2017 constitutes €10 
million). Through these funds, a number of programs is implemented, namely: 
                                                 
23 
 “The National Security Strategy of Ukraine”, cit. 
24
  O. Kramar, “Take Out the Head from the Sand”, cit. 
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the modernization of communication systems and automation of the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine, retraining and resettlement of those who visited the area ATO (“Anti-
terror operation”), physical rehabilitation and prosthetics of the wounded, 
reformation and harmonization of Logistics of the Armed Forces according to 
NATO standards, and the fight against cybercrimes25. In addition, diplomats say 
that the NATO cluster system, in which every member-state specializes in a 
particular branch of the defence sphere, can give Ukraine the opportunity to direct 
their own development of military industry into a “right” channel26. 
 
 
Alternative Regional Security Systems 
 
Issues of probability of Ukraine’s accession to NATO remain open, 
given the complexity and inconsistency of prioritizing by the Ukrainian people 
and their elites, and the attitude of Ukraine’s partners to its Euro-Atlantic 
choice, their readiness to accept Ukraine. Along with this, national analysts 
have proposals on the formation of alternative (sub)regional security systems 
caused by the probability of blocking or decelerating Ukraine’s integration into 
NATO by the Russian Federation and other subjects or factors. L. Chekalenko 
notes that Ukraine needs a new protection model. Therefore, it is advisable to 
suggest NATO to provide Ukraine with a partner status of “strategic liability” 
and secure it legally. In addition, Valeeva claims the necessity of a military 
association with the neighbours “Ukraine+”, drawing attention to those states 
which indeed can support us: Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Iran, etc.27. 
Thus, such analysts as O. Kramar suggest using the experience of 
military-political alliances created during the Cold War by the most active 
members of the Alliance in Asia and the Pacific region. These were original 
“copies” of NATO which encompassed local states along with the member-
states (the USA, the UK, Turkey, France) that had some particular spheres of 
interests. For instance, in 1955-1979, CENTO block existed in the Middle East. 
The association included today’s three NATO members: the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Turkey; in Southeast Asia, 1955-1977, SEATO involved 
the USA, the UK and France, and in the Pacific region, ANZUS included the 
USA, Australia and New Zealand28.  
Another suggestion concerns creation of a regional defence alliance in 
the Baltic-Black Sea arch (including Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Belarus 
                                                 
25
  M. Majer, “It Is Important for Ukraine to Keep Patience”, cit. 
26
  “NATO Countries Need Ukraine Not Less than We Need Them”, cit. 
27
  Yu. Valeeva, “The Challenges to European Security Architecture: Ukrainian Context”, 
cit. 
28
  O. Kramar, “Take Out the Head from the Sand”, cit. 
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and Ukraine), the foundation of which would be similar to the NATO Charter 
(containing real, not just declared commitments of security).  
The development of such a regional collective security system can be a 
transitional step towards the accession by all its members to the Alliance, 
establishing guarantees of the “nuclear umbrella” and an effective system of 
military support from the USA, the UK and other Member states in case of 
aggression of “the third” force against the subjects of the arch. Such a union can 
be formed with the participation of Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Baltic, 
Caucasus, and other states with the necessary involvement of the USA and the 
UK into its structure29. These two models should be represented schematically.  
Feasibly, the hypothetical proposals and analytical developments 
concerning possibilities of establishing and operating new collective security 
systems in the near future is an urgent issue only for Ukrainian scientists, 
politicians, journalists and activists. In the European information space, 
unfortunately, there is no discourse which would reflect theoretical elaborations 
of geopolitical strategies, and thus, the practical security strategy to combat 
eastern aggression does not exist. However, the contradiction between key 
international players interferes with the actual creation of effective security 
structures in Europe and in the world30. Particularly, the EU continues to 
respond situationally (tactically) to Russian aggression against Ukraine, hoping 
for exhaustion of masses and Russian elites from economic downturn. Another 
possibility, and more realistic one according to analysts, is to wait until the conflict 
in Donbass “freezes” or completely “rests on the shoulders” of Ukraine because of 
apparent, one-sided implementation of Minsk agreements by the latter31. 
Obviously, the prospects of European security directly depend on the 
probability of the emergence of a “frozen conflict” in Ukraine, which would not 
only stop the process of democratization and European integration, but also 
create a source of instability and a threat to the whole Europe. The following 
factors will cause such a scenario: Russia’s attempts to legitimize the so-called 
Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic, force the Ukrainian 
authorities to conduct direct dialogue with these terrorist groups, non-fulfilment 
of the Minsk agreements, etc. With the deployment of “frozen” conflicts in 
neighbouring countries, Russia is trying to stop integration of its satellites into 
the EU and NATO32. Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are examples of 
such influence of the Russian Federation. The danger of this scenario increases. 
Possible evolutions of relations between Russia, the USA, the EU and NATO 
                                                 
29
  O. Kramar, “Take Out the Head from the Sand”, cit. 
30
  “Ukraine Security Policy in the Context of the Collective Security System in Europe: A 
Policy Brief”, The National Institute for Strategic Studies, July 12, 2015, 
www.niss.gov.ua/articles/421. 
31 
 А. Korbut, “Neighbourhood Disagreement”, cit. 
32
  J. Bugajski, The Cold Peace. Russia's New Imperialism, Praeger, New York, 2004.  
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could lead to a transformation of the “frozen conflict” zones in the CIS region 
(Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Crimea) and 
potential conflict zones (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, in particular) into a 
bargaining chip in the fight of global and regional leaders for the spheres of 
influence. It can result in tensions in defined regions, emergence of new 
division lines, and spread of conflict to neighbouring countries and regions. 
Therefore, the creation of “frozen conflicts” (pro-Russian enclaves) in eastern 
Ukraine will become not only a tool used by Russia for political and economic 
exhaustion of Ukraine and slowdown of its European and Euro-Atlantic integration, 
but also a means to keep in suspense the whole system of regional security. 
It is clear that elaborating a common strategic approach to security 
within the European space is most necessary and vital primarily for Central and 
Eastern European states. However, their association in a strong political and 
security alliance faces numerous problems. For example, Alexander Korbut 
analyzes the Visegrad group, whose members, after joining NATO and the EU, 
“fell asleep on the laurels of success”, having lost the motivation to act and thus, 
did not develop a common vision of their future political and security priorities.  
In January 2015 was created the “Slavkovsk Triangle” by the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Austria, whose heads of governments distanced from 
further strengthening of EU sanctions against Russia and spoke for restoration of 
political and economic cooperation with Russia in the long term. Representatives of 
the group assure that it will not become an alternative to the Visegrad Group, 
although the confidence of the Polish elite in these “too independent” partners is 
already undermined, taking into account the indicated facts33. 
Therefore, given the situational displays of solidarity of the Visegrad 
Group members, Ukraine does not seek for new forms of collective defence in 
its framework. In this context, attention is drawn to the security strategy of 
Poland and the Baltic States, which currently look for support within NATO 
and do not try to simultaneously build regional security networks (including the 
one which involves the Scandinavian countries) in which they would be less 
dependent on Western European allies who do not exhibit excessive readiness 
to defend their allies in the case of a military crisis34. Thus, Germany and 
France oppose the expansion of permanent contingent of NATO in Eastern 
European countries. In its turn, Poland, which has chosen to bandwagon with 
US foreign policy as a priority, buys the US SAM Patriot and is ready to place 
heavy American weapons on its territory. In the international debate, Ukraine is 
not mentioned even as a potential partner in the regional security network35. 
                                                 
33
  А. Korbut, “Neighbourhood Disagreement”, cit. 
34
  Ibidem. 
35
  Ibidem. 
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On the other hand, the Baltic States and Poland are the partners which 
can support Ukraine in confronting its aggressor from the East. E. Lucas notes 
that these states have a deep culture of strategic vision. In these countries, 
public and professional politicians are aware of the need for a serious approach 
to defence. An example of such strategic vision is the activity of Estonia, which 
enables it to leave beyond NATO standard 2% of GDP for defence budget. 
Since 2005, Polish military expenditures have increased by 38% in real terms, 
and in 2015, they were planned to increase further – almost by 20%. In 
particular, $10 billion spent on missile defence is considered here. Instead, 
Lithuania regained conscription and doubled spending on defence. Even Latvia, 
which traditionally for the Baltic region “lags behind” in the military sphere, 
has increased the defence budget by 15%36. 
Therefore, despite scepticism about the Ukrainian partnership in 
security alliances, we agree with the opinion of E. Lucas on division of Europe 
into countries whose elites are afraid of Russian revisionism, and other 
countries whose elites are not afraid of this. Based on this division and the 
increasing number of states that are aware of the aggression possibility 
(according to E. Lucas, “the coalition of scared”), the formation of a 
Scandinavian-Baltic-Polish security alliance (including Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, the Baltic states and Poland) is possible (also with the possible support 
of the USA), which overlaps the division of NATO members and non-members37. 
E. Lucas notes that the association of states in this security alliance 
would require painful changes. In particular, Poland would have to seriously 
consider “smaller” neighbours' elites; the Baltic States – to agree with the 
involvement of partners outside NATO into their defence; Sweden and Finland 
– to deepen mutual collaboration and cooperation with the Alliance, and, at last, 
to end the philosophical arguments concerning undesired dependency on non-
member-states38. 
In addition, analysts point out that such security and defence structures, 
based on Visegrad Group, involving Ukraine and Romania, and with the 
political center in Warsaw are especially advantageous for the USA39, would be 
viable only under the leadership of America, which is an important partner for 
all countries of the region and for which this structure is beneficial40. However, 
some US experts suggested the formation of a regional alliance strategy on 
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long-term containment of Russia. This has not been vividly supported by the US 
government yet41.  
Of course, although until recently the highlighted ideas were not even 
discussed by officials, now there is a high probability of their implementation. 
Particularly, the initiative of creating a new geopolitical influential block involving 
Ukraine, Poland and Romania was introduced by the newly elected Polish President 
Andrzej Duda42. This would imply a partnership which covers the territory from the 
Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas. According to A. Duda, “The state is 
strong when it is surrounded by allies; it is also an element of increasing the 
strength in the world. Currently, there are signals from heads of states in the region 
that indicate a desire to conduct meetings and negotiations”43. 
Analysts state that the projects of such unions appeared after the First 
World War. For example, the idea of “Intermarium” was mentioned (see Picture 
1) by the Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski, who was visiting Poland, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, and Finland. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
Ukrainian social and political activist Yuri Lypa wrote about creation of the 
Baltic-Black Sea Union. American geopolitists called this union “Intermarium” 
– from Latin “between seas”44. The main purpose of this association is the 
desire to transform the specified region from the object into the subject of 
collective global policy able to compete for global leadership. 
 
 
Picture 1. “Intermarium” 
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A Union between Ukraine and Poland in the economic, political and 
military spheres would be evidence of the possibility to restructure the 
European geopolitical “chessboard” because this union could compete with 
such countries, as France, the UK, and “outrun” Russian potential. 
The fact that Ukraine and Poland can freely compete on the European 
and international markets is not only geopolitically beneficial, but also 
industrially and commercially. In geopolitical terms, such an association would 
“completely block” a land route from Europe (from the Baltic and the Black 
Seas) to Asia. This union has significant advantages for the states also in the 
military sphere (interest-free loans to the Ukrainian defence industry, 
transferring innovative developments to the defence enterprises, grants for 
armed forces of Ukraine, similar to those received by Israel and Turkey)45.  
Along with a large number of benefits, such an alliance should 
overcome a number of institutional obstacles. The problem is that the potential 
subjects of the Union (except for Ukraine) are EU and NATO member-states 
and cannot solve the suggested geopolitical dilemmas. After all, there are 
allegations that the existence of an independent European security is impossible 
without NATO, and this powerful alliance plays a key role in systems of 
regional and global security. For several further decades, a major unifying point 
for European policymakers will be the strengthening of NATO, and not the EU 
enlargement. Therefore, economic priorities will continue to be replaced by the 
military ones. The Euro-Atlantic security zone will be further strengthened, and 
Sweden and Finland may become the first candidates for its entry46. 
Under these circumstances, if Ukraine does not fully participate in the 
system of Euro-Atlantic security, it will be deprived of guarantees for its own 
security47. However, own efforts have to be put into the field of security and 
defence, as partners’ help may be delayed. This is supported by the experience 
of most members of the European community which for a long time relied on 
NATO, delegating to the alliance powers to protect their territory from potential 
external threats and actually refusing to invest in their own defence. Nowadays, 
most NATO and EU member-states understand that they have to work out their 
own strategic positions concerning national, regional and continental security, 
develop full-fledged intelligence, army, to advance military culture and become 
stronger in this sense48. 
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Conclusion 
 
All in all, security plans of the European and US elites reflect European 
and Euro-Atlantic prospects of Ukraine in a complicated and contradictory way. 
In general, currently Ukraine is not regarded as a full partner. Ukrainian 
analysts suggest that the initiative in this matter was overtaken by Kyiv. They 
define and emphasize positive consequences of its internal reforms, justify plans 
for further changes, propose new strategic vision of regional security structure 
and define the place of Ukraine in it.  
Presently, our state has to search ways of effective cooperation with 
NATO, given the differences in its members’ views on developments related to 
the latest threats, aggression and behaviour of Russia. Ukraine should take the 
liberty in launching the creation of a new security system and actively 
participate in its formation along with other states in the region. Obviously, 
NATO membership is widely supported by the population, but joining this 
organization is hardly probable for Ukraine. Thus, the issue of developing 
Ukraine’s own strategic and tactical action plans which would include a variety 
of options for national and European security is referred to. If our country’s 
membership in NATO is significantly delayed, a new format of relations with 
the Alliance has to be elaborated: to conclude a specific “union”, to create a 
common area of collective security (by M. Kapitonenko), to strengthen and 
deepen partnership in all areas. Therefore, there is substantial need in further 
research of innovative developments, ideas, and paradigms suggested by 
analysts and political activists on possible alternatives for future geopolitical 
choices of Ukraine and its place on the political map of its region and the world. 
 
 
